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This study argues that product substitutability and complementary have major effects
on the relationship between innovation and competition and some interesting conclu-
sions are derived. First, innovative investment is reduced with market power. The
total quantity of products and social welfare are increased with market power while
decreased with increasing of substitutability or deceasing of complementary. Second,
the equilibrium products and innovative investment are lower than those under social
optimality. Finally, by comparison with Cournot quantity competition, Bertrand price
competition is keener. But the main conclusions are the same under both kinds of
competitions.
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1. Introduction
Since Schumpeter (1942) proposed innovation theory, many people fixed their attention
on innovation behaviour and the relationship between innovation and competition
became an important topic in economics and management. Schumpeter (1942) issued
that monopoly stimulates innovation, but 20 years later Arrow (1962) declared that
competition motivates innovation. Since them, the debate about the relationship between
competition and innovation is continuous. Some people supported Schumpeter (e.g.
Demsetz, 1969; Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Yi, 1999), some people sustained Arrow
(e.g. Recently Holmes, Levine & Schmitz, 2012; Vives, 2008), while some others held
their own opinion (e.g. Aghion et al., 2005; Sacco & Schmutzer, 2011).
What is the relationship between innovation and competition? Different people have
different conclusions, so we do not try to give the final answer to that question. The
purpose of this study is to make efforts to reveal that relationship under some special
conditions.This study addresses the innovation of the only firm with cost advantage,1
while in some literature, all firms launch innovative investment.2 For example, Sacco
and Schmutzer (2011) discussed that all firms launch innovation. Taking spillover into
account, D’aspremont and Jacquemin (1998) explored both cooperative and non-cooper-
ative innovation theory. Wang and Yang (2002) further developed this cooperative inno-
vation theory under a vertically related market structure. The main contributions of this
study lie as follows. First, considering externalities3 (including substitutability and
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complementary), this article examines Arrow’s (1962) innovation theory. Second, taking
externalities into account, this study expands Vives’s (2008) research. Considering the
effects of externalities, this study finds that innovative investment competition is fiercer
than that under product quantity competition in Vives’s (2008) study. Finally, this study
expands the theory about substitutability. Substitutability not only effects product
competition, but also effects firm’s innovation investment.
Taking product externalities, including substitutability and complementary into
account, both under Cournot quantity competition and Bertrand price competition, this
study further addresses the relationship between innovation and competition. This study
argues that complementary and substitutability have major effects on the relationship
between innovation and competition. Market power has negative effects on innovative
investment. Both total quantity of products and social welfare are reduced with substi-
tutability. High market power improves the total quantity of products and social welfare.
Moreover, higher substitutability reduces profits of firms with higher costs of produc-
tion. Furthermore, we find that social welfare under equilibrium is lower than under
optimality. Besides, by comparing Bertrand with Cournot, this study argues that
Bertrand competition is more intense than that of Cournot competition.4
2. Literature review
Many people focus their attention on the relationship between innovation and competi-
tion. So before stating our own research, we will introduce some major prior studies.
Following Arrow’s idea, there exist many important papers. Recently, Holmes,
Levine and Schmitz (2008) developed a theory of switchover disruptions under the
monopoly market structure, and their conclusions support Arrow’s idea. Vives (2008)
developed an innovation theory under competition and his study took market structure
as a major fact. Chen and Sappington (2010) further discussed innovation under verti-
cally related market structures. Vives (2008) and Chen and Sappington (2010) drew the
same conclusions as Arrow (1962).
On the other hand, Arrow’s proposal has been intensely debated for many years.
Perhaps the most famous critique came from Demsetz (1969) and Yi (1999). Demsetz
(1969) and Yi (1999) discussed that Arrow’s idea manifests that increased competition
yields less innovation. Another important critique is proposed by Gilbert and Newbery
(1982), in which Arrow’s assumptions were changed and it showed that a monopolist
has a greater incentive to adopt new technologies. In other words, those earlier studies
hold the similar viewpiont as Schumpeter (1942).
More significantly, some other people took the strategic effects of innovation into
account. Maybe the most important research came form Brander and Spencer (1983)
and Spence (1984). Strategic effects means cost reduction innovation reduces output of
its competitors. Brander and Spencer (1983) declared that strategic effects increases total
amount of R&D and total output. Spence’s (1984) research considered spillover of
R&D. Then Bester and Petrakis (1993) investigated how product substitutability incites
cost reduction innovation both under Betrand competition and Cournot competition. In
their model, two firms acted under a social planner. As a result, two firms should pro-
duce heterogeneity products, or the social planner would only operate the more efficient
firm. And they issued that one cannot draw a general conclusion about the relationship
between innovation and substitutability. That two firms should act under a social planner
could also be seen as a drawback of Bester and Petrakis’s (1993) study, because all
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conclusions in their study were constrained in planning economics. More interestingly,
Nie and Chen (2012) investigated doupoly competition with input constraints.
In theoretical studies, there also exists plenty of important literature about the rela-
tionship between innovative investment and competitive pressure. Arrow (1962) initially
advanced that monopolistic industries would be less innovative than competitive ones.
Aghion et al. (2005) further examined an inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovation. Schmutzler (2007) discussed the relationship between R&D and compe-
tition with a two-stage model. Under a linear demand function, Sacco and Schmutzer
(2011) confirmed the U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation with
numerical simulations. Narajabad and Watson (2011) studied dynamic innovation under
production differentiation. Furthermore, Regarding empirical conclusions, using the Sta-
tistics Canada 1999 Survey of Innovation, Tang (2006) examined that this relationship
is affected by many factors, such as substitutability, constant arrival of competing prod-
ucts and so on. Tang (2006) confirmed that market power has negative effects on the
innovative investment under substitutability. Patel and Ward (2011) estimated competi-
tion in innovative market with patent citation patterns.
Summarising from those prior studies, we obtain the conclusions that there are three
kinds of issues about the relationship between innovation and competition. First, compe-
tition stimulates innovation. Second, competition inhibits innovation. And the relation-
ship between them is U or an inverted-U shape. But we think that the relationship
between innovation and competition are depended. On the one hand, the relationship
between innovation and competition depends on the descriptions of innovation, such as
cost-reducing or quality-inproving innovation. On the other hand, which depends on the
descriptions of competition, such as market concentration or substitutability. So we will
investigate the relationship between innovation and competition under the special state
that firms produce with different efficiency and only the low cost firm invests innova-
tion, but not to join in the debate. Different from other studies, the value interval of γ in
our study is from −1 to 1, which means γ can been regarded as substitutability as well
as complementary.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. The model is established in Section 3.
In this model, complementary and substitutability along with innovative investment are
introduced. Then model analyses are present in Section 4, which contains two parts.
The model of Cournot quantity competition is analysed in part A. By analysing the
model, some useful conclusions are drawn. The model of Bertrand price competition is
addressed in part B. The price and social welfare under Bertrand are compared with
those under Cournot. Some remarks are presented in the final section.
3. Model
The model of duopoly innovation is established. Different from other studies (Aghion,
et al., 2005; Sacco, Schmutzler, 2011; Schmutzler, 2007), this study applies a one-stage
model.5 In our model, product externality is fully addressed. Assume that there are two
producers, and denoted by i ∊ N = {1, 2}. qi represents the product quantity of firm i,
i = 1, 2. Given the prices of the two firms, p1 and p2, the representative consumer’s
(net) utility function is outlined by the following function.
uðp1; p2; q1; q2Þ ¼ Aðq1 þ q2Þ  p1q1  p2q2  12 ðq
2
1 þ q22Þ  cq1q2: (1)
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In the above, A > 0represents the maximum price that consumers are willing to pay for
either good, and γ ∊ [−1, 1] denotes the externality parameter. The inverse linear
demand functions are outlined as follows, which are directly obtained from (1).
p1 ¼ A q1  cq2; p2 ¼ A q2  cq1: (2)
γ = 0 means that two goods are independent; γ = 1 indicates perfect substitutes; γ = − 1
signifies perfect complements of the firms’ products. Furthermore, γ ∊ [ − 1, 0) means
that one firm has positive externality on the other firm, or both firms benefit from each
other’s production, while γ ∊ [0, 1] represents that the products of the two firms are
substitutes.
We note that (1) is employed in Liu and Wang (Lin and Henry, 2013), and Sacco
and Schmutzer (2011) with γ ∊ [0, 1]. The parameter γ ∊ [ − 1, 1) is also regarded as
the externality of one firm exerted on the other. This study extends the models of Liu
and Wang (2011) and Sacco and Schmutzer (2011).
Initially, the firms’ marginal costs of production are c1 and c2, respectively. We
assume that c2 = c1 + τ, where τ > 0 denotes the cost advantage or market power of the
first firm. The first firm launches innovative investment I1 at the same time when it
make output decision,6 while the second firm makes no innovative investment. This is
the benchmark model of innovation of Arrow (1962) or Holmes, Levine and Schmitz
(2008). The cost associated with innovative investment I1 is 12 I
2
1 . Profit functions of the
two firms are given as follows.
p1 ¼ ½p1  c1ðI1Þq1  12 I
2
1 ; (3)
p2 ¼ ðp2  c2Þq2: (4)
With innovative investment I1 of the first firm, the marginal cost of the first firm
becomes c1(I1), where c1(0) = c1 and c1(I1) is convex and continuously decreasing in I1.
We further assume that @c1ðI1Þ@I1 [  1. Since the reduction in marginal cost incurred by
innovation is not too much, this hypothesis is reasonable. To simplify the problem, we
further assume that c1(I1) = c1 g(I1) = (c2 − τ)g(I1), where g(I1) > 0 is continuously
decreasing for all I1 and convex. Obviously, g(0) = 1.
4. Model analyses
To compare different models, we analyse the duopoly model based on quantity (or
Cournot) competition and price (or Bertrand) competition. Most conclusions are similar
in the two models, which mean the conclusions are robust. Furthermore, we find that
Bertrand competition seems fiercer than Cournot competition.
A. Results under Cournot quantity competition.
The model is addressed in this section. The equilibrium is outlined and characterised
under Cournot. Under Cournot competition, the two firms compete in quantity. From
(2)–(4), profit functions are restated as follows:




pC2 ¼ ðA q2  cq1  c2Þq2: (6)
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The two firms maximise (5) and (6), respectively by choosing q1, I1 and q2. The
equilibrium is discussed next. Since c1(I1) is convex and continuously decreasing, both
(5) and (6) are concave functions in the respective choice variables. Therefore, there




¼ f1 ¼ ½A cq2  c1ðI1Þ  2q1 ¼ 0: (7)
@pC1
@I1
¼ f2 ¼ q1 @c1ðI1Þ
@I1
 I1 ¼ 0: (8)
@pC2
@q2
¼ f3 ¼ ðA cq1  c2Þ  2q2 ¼ 0: (9)
Equation (8) manifests that the marginal cost incurred by innovative investment is
exactly equal to the marginal benefit caused by innovative investment. Obviously, from
(7) and (9) we have the relationship that q1 > q2.
By virtue of (7)–(9), we have the following conclusion
Proposition 1. Given c2, a larger cost advantage yields lower innovative investment
and higher total quantity in the industry.
Proof: See Appendix. ■
Remarks: We have concluded that market power has a negative relationship with
innovative investment under substitutability, successfully explaining the empirical
results of Tang (2006). This conclusion is consistent with those in Vives (2008) and
Arrow’s idea (1962). Conclusions of Proposition 1 are more extensive than those of
Tang (2006). Apparently, q1 increases with its cost advantage while q2 decreases with
first firm’s cost advantage. Besides, @q1@s þ @q2@s [ 0, which means that the total products
in this industry are increasing with cost advantage of the first firm. Larger market
power of the first firm increases the quantity of products of the first firm and the
total quantity of products in the industry. Moreover, cost advantage of the first firm
has more effects on its own products than that of the second firm because of
j@q1@s j[ j@q2@s j.
The equilibrium quantity and price are further described next. (7) indicates that
q1 = p1 − c1(I1). (9) implies that q2 = p2 − c2. From (7)–(9), we have
Proposition 2. Under the equilibrium state, the total quantity of outputs q = q1 + q2,
q2 and p2 all decrease with γ. Both I1 and q1 decrease with γ if 2q2 > γq1 but increase
with γ if 2q2 ⩽ γq1.
Proof: See Appendix. ■
Remarks: The above proposition illustrates that the total quantity of products, q2 and p2
decrease with the externality parameter. Obviously, according to Proposition 2, the
first firm’s innovative investment and its quantity are reduced with positive externality
(product complementary or γ < 0).
The total quantity of production of the two firms is further discussed. According to
the above analysis, we have the interesting relationship @q1@c þ @q2@c \0, which means that
as γ increases, total outputs of the industry decrease. Because of larger substitutability
parameter, competition in the industry becomes fiercer and the total demand for
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products in this industry is reduced. By the proof of Proposition 2, we also have the
significant relationship that j@q1@c j\j@q2@c j; which indicates that γ has more effects on the
quantity of the second firm than that of the first firm.
Here, the profits of two producers are remarked. By the envelope theorem, we have
the following conclusion.
Proposition 3. Under equilibrium state, the profits of the second firm satisfy:
@pC2
@c \0:
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Remarks: With a large γ, the two firms compete drastically and the second firm under-
takes a loss. In other words, γ reduces the profit of the second firm. It is not sure about
the effect of parameterγon the first firm’s profits.
Actually, from (2), (7)–(9), we immediately have the following equations
pC1 ¼ q21  12 I21 and pC2 ¼ q22. Obviously,
@pC2
@c \0. It is difficult to determine the effects of
γ on pC1 ¼ q21  12 I21 :
Social welfare (SW) is addressed next. Social welfare (SW) is the sum of consumer
surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS). CS is given by (1) and PS is given by (3) and
(4).
SW ¼ CS þ PS ¼ Aðq1 þ q2Þ  12 ðq
2
1 þ q22Þ  cq1q2  c1ðI1Þq1 
1
2
I21  c2q2: (10)









 I1 ¼ 0; (12)
@SW
@q2
¼ A q2  cq1  c2 ¼ 0: (13)
Comparing (7)–(9) with (11)–(13), we draw the following conclusions:
Proposition 4. The quantity of products under duopoly is lower than that of social opti-
mality. Under equilibrium based on (7)–(9), social welfare in the industry is increased
with market power while reduced with substitutability.
Proof: Denote the solution of (7)–(9) by ðqC;1 ; qC;2 ; IC;1 Þ and the corresponding social
welfare by SWC,*. Let the social optimal solution to (11)–(13) be ðq1; q2;I1Þ and the cor-
responding social welfare is S W . Apparently, A qC;1  cqC;2  c1ðIC;1 Þ ¼ qC;1 and




Given c2, we have
@SW
@s
















ðq1; q2; I1 Þ
¼ @ðq1 þ q2Þ
@s
þ gðI1Þq1
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@SW
@c














ðq1; q2; I1 Þ
¼ @ðq1 þ q2Þ
@c
 q2q1
ðq1; q2; I1 Þ
\0:
Therefore, the social welfare in this industry is increased with market power while
reduced with higher substitutability or lower complementary.
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Remarks: Proposition 4 implies that the equilibrium products of the two firms are lower
than those of the social optimum. There exists underinvestment in innovation. Under
equilibrium, social welfare is increased with market power because of lower costs of the
first firm. Social welfare is reduced with higher substitutability or lower complementary
because larger parameter γ yields more fierce competition.
From Propositions 1–4, we learn that the firms benefit from innovation and social
welfare is also promoted by innovation, which means government and firms should
share the cost of innovation. That is the reason why the government spends a lot of
their revenue in firms’ innovations every year.
According to (7)–(9) and (11)––(13), governmental subsidies in innovation can effi-
ciently improve quantity of products and social welfare.
B. Results Under Bertrand Price Competition.
Here the Bertrand price competition is discussed, in which the two firms compete in
prices. If γ2 ≠ 1, (2) is restated as follows:
q1 ¼ Að1 cÞ  p1 þ cp21 c2 ; q2 ¼
Að1 cÞ  p2 þ cp1
1 c2 : (14)
If γ2 = 1, p1 = p2 under Bertrand competition, which is an existing conclusion in the lit-
erature. So γ2 = 1is not considered in the following. Hence, the substitutability is partial
in this section:
By (3), (4) and (14), the two firms aim to solve the following problems:
max
p1;I1
pB1 ¼ ½p1  c1ðI1Þ







pB2 ¼ ðp2  c2Þ
Að1 cÞ  p2 þ cp1
1 c2 : (16)
Since both (15) and (16) are concave, there exists a unique solution which is determined
by the first order conditions of (15)–(16). The corresponding first order optimal condi-
tions are listed as follows:
@pB1
@p1
¼ g1 ¼ Að1 cÞ þ cp2 þ c1ðI1Þ1 c2 
2p1
1 c2 ¼ 0; (17)
@pB1
@I1
¼ g2 ¼ Að1 cÞ þ cp2  p11 c2
@c1ðI1Þ
@I1
 I1 ¼ 0; (18)
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@pB2
@p2
¼ g3 ¼ Að1 cÞ þ cp1 þ c21 c2 
2p2
1 c2 ¼ 0: (19)
Considering (17)–(19) and checking Propositions 1–4, we immediately have the
following conclusions.
Proposition 5. Propositions 1–4 all hold under Bertrand price competition.
Proof: Similar to the proofs of Propositions 1–4. Based on (17)–(19), the corresponding
conclusions are drawn. ■
Remarks: The above proposition manifests that the relationships between market power
and price as well as quantity under Bertrand competition are similar to those under
Cournot competition.
Denote the equilibrium under Bertrand competition by ðpB;1 ; pB;2 ; IB;1 ; qB;1 ; qB;2 Þ and
the corresponding social welfare by SWB,*. We then have the following relationships.
Proposition 6. Comparing the equilibrium under Bertrand with that under Cournot, we



















C; 6 SWB; 6
S W :
Proof: See Appendix. ■
Remarks: The above conclusions illustrate that Bertrand competition seems to be much
fiercer than Cournot competition both in prices and in innovative investment. Therefore,
prices under Bertrand are lower than those under Cournot, while quantity of outputs,
innovative investment and social welfare under Bertrand are all higher than those under
Cournot.
Here an explanation is presented about the above conclusions. Under Bertrand com-
petition, firms compete directly and this competition seems fiercer than Cournot compe-
tition. Therefore, prices under Bertrand are lower and quantities are higher than those
under Cournot.
5. Concluding remarks
The conclusions in this article are consistent with some eminent prior research, includ-
ing Arrow (1962), Qiu (1997), Tang (2006), and Vives (2008), although this research
uses different models and different competition structures. That means the conclusions
are quite robust. This article finds that innovation decreases with market power,7 the
same as Arrow (1962). It also finds higher substitutability yield lower total quantity of
products in the industry. Using the Bowley linear demand system, Vives (2008) and Qiu
(1997) reach similar conclusions. This research reaches the same conclusion as Qiu
(1997) that price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition.
And you can also find empirical support of the conclusions in Tang (2006). And differ-
ent from Bester and Petrakis (1993), we need no social planner.
This study addresses the relationship between innovation and competition under
product externality based on Arrow’s (1962) innovation theory. For the different mea-
sures of market power, we measure it with cost advantage while Vives (2008) with
Lerner index, this article contrasts with Vives’s (2008) conclusion about the effect of
market power on innovation. By a duopoly model both under quantity (Cournot) and
price (Bertrand) competition, the conclusions, in which market power has negative
effects on innovative investment, supports the empirical evidence in Tang (2006).
Higher substitutability yields lower total quantity of products in the industry and lower
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profits of the firm with higher costs of production. The equilibrium products and inno-
vative investment are all lower than social optimum. Social welfare is also reduced with
higher substitutability because a larger externality parameter yields fiercer competition.
These conclusions are robust under different models.
There are some further researching topics following this work. This study discusses
the innovation of firms with cost advantage and it is interesting to extend to general sit-
uations. When two firms simultaneously launch innovative investment, it is interesting
to capture. Besides, if positive externality (or product complementary) is strong enough,
firms will be co-innovation or free-riding. These are our further research topics.
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Notes
1. Cost advantage can also be seen as market power. A firm with cost advantage has the power
to change price first. The price is given in this study, but cost advantage can be use as compe-
tition threat to the competitor.
2. Only the cost advantage firm innovates is reasonable and the reason for the cost disadvantage
one does not innovate is that it does not have enough money to innovate or the revenues are
less than its costs when it innovates.
3. Noting that externalities here mean the interaction between products produced by different
firms, including substitutability and complementary, which are different from the externality
of innovation in of other studies such as Spence (1984) and Bester and Petrakis (1993).
4. Though Bertrand competition is fiercer than Cournot competition, the conclusions under both
models are robust.
5. On the one hand, only one firm invests innovation in our model. On the other hand, we
assume that firm makes innovation and output decision at the same time (or the firm makes
output decision soon after innovation). So we set up a one-stage game model.
6. Which means we assumes simultaneous decision in the innovation stage between R&D and
production (non-strategic R&D).
7. This study gets the same conclusion as Arrow (1962) but market power in this article is mea-
sured in different way from Arrow.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1
























2  @c1ðI1Þ@I1 c
 @c1ðI1Þ@I1 q1
@2c1ðI1Þ





























2  @1ðI1Þ@I1 c
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ð4þ c2Þ þ 2 @c1ðI1Þ@I1
h i2
\0. This inequality comes from the
hypotheses that 0[ @c1ðI1Þ@I1 [  1 and γ ∊ [ − 1, 1]. By the implicit function theorem, there exists













c2 þ 2 @c1ðI1Þ@I1
@c1ðI1Þ
@s
¼ 4q1 dgðI1ÞdI1  q1
dgðI1Þ
@I1
c2  2 @c1ðI1Þ@I1 gðI1Þ






















2  @c1ðI1Þ@I1 c
 @c1ðI1Þ@I1 q1
@2c1ðI1Þ
@ðI1Þ2  1 0










Obviously, we have @ðq1þq2Þ@s [ 0:
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Propositions 2






















\0 2q2 [ cq1
> 0 2q2 6 cq1:






2  @c1ðI1Þ@I1 c
 @c1ðI1Þ@I1 q1
@2c1ðI1Þ




















Apparently, because γ < 1, we have @q1@c þ @q2@c \0: Combined with q2 = p2 − c2, we therefore have
that both q = q1 + q2 and price p2 decrease with γ.

















\0 2q2 [ cq1
 0 2q2  cq1

I1 decreases with γ if 2q2 > γq1 but increases with γ if 2q2 ⩽ γq1. Conclusions are therefore
achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Propositions 3
We first show the relationship @q1@c










q1 @2c1ðI1Þ@ðI1Þ2  1
h i















We therefore have @p2@c ¼ q1q2  cq2 @q1@c \0. Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is
complete. ■
Proof of Propositions 4
Here we show Proposition 4. By virtue of (17)–(19), we immediately have the following system





















































ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ
¼ cq1; @q2@p1

ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ
¼ c1c2 ; @q1@p1

ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ




ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ
¼ 0: By vir-




ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ
¼ 0, we therefore have @pC1@q1

ðqB;1 ;qB;2 ;IB;1 Þ
\0. According to the con-










ðqC;1 ;qC;2 ;IC;1 Þ
¼ 0, we immediately have the relationship
qC;1  qB;1 . Similarly, we have qC;2  qB;2 .
From (18), qC;1  qB;1 ; qC;2  qB;2 : and the convexity of c1(I1) yields. Ic;1  IB;1 . qC;1  qB;1 ;









1  qB;1 ; qC;2  qB;2 and I c;1  IB;1 : Induce SWC,* ⩽ SWB,*.
Combining with the conclusion of Proposition 5, we have:SWB;  S W .
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
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